As the US administration sees the growing reality of its relationship with China, it is unclear whether it will understand the implications of a major power struggle with China. Technology is central to the new competition and American policymakers rely on well-established, time-tested, and sadly outdated strategic vision.
White House Indo-Pacific Policy Coordinator Kurt Campbell described it as a “dominant example” in US-China relations. The central role of the military is a multifaceted struggle. The main battlefield, however, will have economic and ideological consequences. Domestic economic success, like that of China’s Belt and Road Inive TV, will provide support and investment. This success is based on a political-economic model that will improve the lives of many. It affirms the basic vision and makes it more inviting for others.
The key to economic success is controlling new and innovative technologies. Those innovations have potential, says McKinsey Global Institute, “to influence billions of consumers, hundreds of millions of workers, and trillions of dollars in economic activity across industries.” Companies operating in those fields ensure revenue that facilitates good investment, research and development cycles that can increase their dominance in technologies. They also promote international standards that are locked in their leadership positions.
The supremacy of technology gives legitimacy to that country’s innovative model by strengthening its soft power. The technology that facilitates monitoring and control will appeal to automakers and authorities. This technology helps to keep regimes that are under the control of their own misbehavior and the burden of domination. This will strengthen the appeal of countries that can provide such technology.
The potential impact of technology-related leadership is disappearing. The US National Intelligence Council (NIC) reported in a recent Global Trend Report: “Some areas of technology seem to offer opportunities for change. . . Advances in these areas connect with other technologies, such as energy storage, to shape communities, economies, and perhaps the nature of energy. In a recent analysis, researchers at the Georgetown Center for Security and Emerging Technologies (CCE) explain how artificial intelligence can create new forms of energy and influence in a global system.
Significantly, those technologies are interconnected. The key components of the digital economy are interdependent. The NC highlighted this phenomenon in a report on past Global Trends: NCC Analysis “highlighted how materials and products are inseparable in the long-term virtues cycle. . . It will be accelerated due to the relative increase in high performance computing, material modeling, artificial intelligence (II) and biometric materials. This is also evident in the growing 5G environment. The combination of 5G hardware, billions of sensors, devices and connections and created and presented information and AI that can sort and analyze everything in real time will create a new world.
These are truly “critical technologies.”
China will get it. Chinese President Xi Jinping In 2014, he said, “Science and technology innovation has become an important support for building a strong national strength.” . . Anyone who holds the key to S&T innovation will take a disgusting step in the game of chess and will be able to outperform their opponents and win the benefits. Four years later, he blocked the need to lead and to do so on his own. This binding has inspired the country’s many national development plans, of which Made in China 2025 is the most famous.
The United States has slowed down. This is the result of a number of factors – misinterpretations of history, a willingness to put ideology into reality, and a dominant belief in the United States in this regard, along with a weakening of China’s efforts.
Fortunately, the cold light of day – and unequivocal evidence that China can win this race – will force a re-examination of US policy. Economic historians have falsely portrayed the idea that the US government left the private sector to its own devices and intervened in the American economy after it was established in the Republic. That evidence shattered the myth of the sole entrepreneur who struggled to succeed in his terms without help and timely opposition from Washington. Both are forced to reconsider the most important “industrial policy”. But old habits are very deadly, and this bitter reality (for some) has made the new approach even more appealing, calling it a “creative policy” or a “competitive policy.”
And soon. Technologists and entrepreneurs warn almost every day that America’s dominance in technology is in jeopardy. Numerous indicators suggest that it may be a thing of the past. Congress has taken steps to promote American competition, such as the American Competition and Innovation Act.
Policies to help the American “game of perdition” have been adapted to more cultural activities to protect intellectual property from theft or illegal acquisition. These measures are part of the John McCain National Defense Licensing Act of 2019, the Export Control Improvement Act (ECR) and the Foreign Investment Risk Assessment Act (FIRRMA). The U.S. administration has other tools at its disposal: the list of Department of Commerce is becoming increasingly popular, and the Trump administration has launched a Chinese Initive TV, led by the Department of Justice, to block and counter national security threats from Chinese activities in the United States.
These efforts have been criticized for being temporary, slow, and well-coordinated, both in the United States and primarily with US partners. Of particular concern is the speed with which the list of emerging and basic technologies needed to implement ECRA and FIRRMA is developed. Some “critical technologies” have been identified, but no progress has been made on “emerging and basic technologies”.
That frustrating speed is partly due to the paradox. Policies aimed at limiting access to China’s advanced technologies and strengthening US competitiveness will jeopardize that competitiveness by destroying the huge market for its products. Silicon Valley warns that sales of U.S. semiconductor manufacturers for sale in China will be huge – in most cases, but not in all cases – a measure that supports the US industrial innovation budget. The industry is vocal in its opposition to restrictive measures and evaluates and evaluates those technologies.
This debate over industrial costs and consequences has obscured another, fundamental, and perhaps unanswered, defensive response to this competition. The Western framework for controlling access to technology is based on “two uses”: if technology has a military application that could compromise the balance of power, then trade is restricted. When a government blurred the lines between military and civilian use, in the absence of a known military-civilian fusion program or MCF program or technology, that logic falls apart. This is becoming increasingly true in terms of technology innovation and speed of deployment. U.S. officials do not know what technologies are available, how they may be used.
Even more disturbing are the logical implications listed above. If some technologies can change the balance of power, even without military intervention, it is important to control their spread. This requires a new approach to competition. If pre-celebrity prizes go as far as they seem — and digital economics, first-time mobility benefits, network outputs, standard settings and system locks, if you can prove that, then governments can’t buy laser-fire. Presentation. The stakes are too high.
There is no better answer to the question of where to draw the line. Dispersal – wholesale, blanket ban – is practical and impossible. However, the potential consequences are such that they want to reduce the risk of slipping downhill.
While this is uncertain, some principles apply. First, the United States needs to better adapt to the value and impact of new technologies. Policymakers generally know their importance. Thus, in recent years there has been lawlessness and attempts to limit their access. But the current control mindset is over. Strategists need to examine how new technologies can be considered not only strategically but also strategically and strategically. They need to know how to use those new skills and how to protect the United States from creative opposition.
Second, the United States must pursue a cooperative approach with partners and partners. One of the greatest strengths of the United States is its partnership and partnership. The cholera epidemic has been emphasized in its entirety because almost every industry in the world is struggling with supply chain vulnerabilities. A key lesson No matter how big or big an economy is, no country can integrate all product networks. Partners and partners should seize the opportunity to work with the United States, not only to protect their own interests, but also in the future, which could blur any isolationist tendencies in Washington. Europe, of course, has repeatedly been targeted by US trade sanctions.
Third, in the digital age, the United States must reconsider security in order to recognize that national security is taking on new dimensions and definitions. It is not enough just to acknowledge new facts or to think that people know what that means. Vulnerabilities are becoming more widespread, creating new responsibilities for governments, businesses and citizens. Power is being redefined and strategists need to think creatively.
Brad Glosserman is the Deputy Director and Visiting Professor at Tama University’s Strategic Policy Center and Senior Advisor (non-resident) at the Pacific Forum. He is the author Peak Japan – The End of Great Wishes And with Scott Snyder, Japan-South Korea identity conflict. He is working on a book on technology and national security.